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DEFINING RELIGION IN OPERATIONAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL TERMS *
A. STEPHEN BOYAN, Jx.t
I
On September 4, 1965, the National Guardian published an ad-
vertisement by a "Christian Communist Movement." The headline
read, "It's time to bridge the gap . . . the apostles of Christ were
Communists."
And all they that believed were together, and had
all things common. Their possessions and goods
they sold, and divided them all, according as every
one had need.
The Bible-Acts 2:44, 45.
From each according to his ability, to each accord-
ing to his need. Karl Marx.'
The advertisement went on to proclaim that "God is pro-communist.
Otherwise he would not have provided the apostles with the power
to perform miracles while they and thousands of their converts prac-
ticed communism." 2 The Christian Communist Movement claims to
be religious-is it possible to deny this characterization for first amend-
ment or other legal purposes?
One commentator has analyzed communism as a religion:
The term "religion" as used today might include almost
any kind of ultimate concern with or without an act of
personal commitment. The Communist, certainly, is grasped
by an ultimate concern which for him is a matter of life or
death, not only personally but also theoretically in terms of
his own insignificance, his not-being and worthlessness
except [as] he participate[s] in the realization of his
Messianic age, his classless society.3
* I am indebted to Professors Marc Galanter, C. Herman Pritchett, and Herbert
Storing for their many suggestions in the preparation of this article. Naturally the
ideas expressed herein are solely the responsibility of the author.
-* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. A.B.
1959, Brown University; M.A. 1961, Tufts University; Ph.D. 1966, University of
Chicago.
'National Guardian, September 4, 1965, at 8.
2 Id.
3 Stahmer, Defining Religion: Federal Aid and Academic Freedom, in RELIGION
AND THE PUBLIC ORDE1, 116, 128-29 (D. Giannella ed. 1963).
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If this theoretical description of religion were translated into a legal
definition, the Christian Communist Movement might fall within it
and become entitled to certain legal privileges and exemptions.4 The
Movement could support this result by arguing that the Supreme
Court's decision in Fowler v. Rhode Island ' prohibits states from
discriminating against a group on the basis of that group's unusual or
unpopular religious beliefs.
In addition, if the Movement were accepted as a religion, the free
exercise clause of the first amendment would entitle it to exemptions
from certain duties and prohibitions that persons and organizations of
a non-religious character must obey. For example, the free exercise
clause recently has been held to protect the right of a child in a public
school to refuse to stand for the singing of the National Anthem,'
the right of a woman to refuse to serve as a juror 7 and the right of a
religious organization of Indians to possess a drug in contravention of
a state narcotics contol law.8 To the objection that this would be un-
reasonable, the Movement could reply that the United States Supreme
Court has indicated that the government may not deprive one religious
group of benefits enjoyed by other religious groups or subject it to
additional burdens. In Everson v. Board of Education,9 the Court
stated that:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one re-
ligion over another."
Despite the importance of the legal definition of religion, judicial
opinions dealing with it have often appeared dogmatic or confused. It
4 1n the area of taxation, for example, religious organizations are commonly
entitled to tax exemptions on their houses of worship, with such exemptions sometimes
extending to such facilities as parsonages and publication houses as well. See, e.g.,
PA. CONST. art. 9, § 1 (permitting legislative exemption from taxation of "actual
places of religious worship"); First Baptist Church v. Pittsburgh, 341 Pa. 568, 20
A.2d 209 (1941) ; Philadelphia v. Barber, 160 Pa. 123, 23 A. 644 (1894) ; ILT- CoNsT.
art. 9, § 3 (permitting legislative exemption of property used for religious purposes) ;
People v. Catholic Bishop, 311 Ill. 11, 142 N.E. 520 (1924) ; Congregational Sunday
School v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. 108, 125 N.E. 7 (1919). On the federal level,
contributions to religious organizations may also be partially tax deductible. INT.
Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 170(b).
0345 U.S. 67 (1953) (state cannot discriminate against one religion by distinguish-
ing sermons (immune from regulation) from addresses (subject to regulation)).
I Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963).
7In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (per curiam), on remand, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d
588 (1963).
8 People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d -716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. .Rptr. 69 (1964).
9330 U.S. 1 (1947).
10 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
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is the purpose of this article to review some of the major judicial
attempts to define religion and to suggest some definitions which, it
is hoped, will avoid some of the difficulties which now surround the
subject.
It
In assessing the courts' attempts" to define religion, it is im-
portant to understand the criteria being used. For example, does
religion involve a belief in a Supreme Being? Is it possible or necessary
to define such a term? Does religion necessarily involve an insti-
tutional structure? To what extent is it relevant that an individual or
group labels or refuses to label a particular belief religious? Must
religion involve beliefs at all? Must it involve some sort of ritual?
Must its adherents meet, regularly or otherwise? Must there be
worship, meditation or designated leaders who perform specified roles?
Judicial opinions, while grappling at times with all of these problems,
have treated extensively only the problem of belief in a Supreme Being;
no opinion has weighed the relative importance of all of these factors.
The traditional understanding of religion in this country has
involved both a concept of God, usually a theistic God"2 and an
institution for His worship, generally understood as a church in the
Christian sense. The remarks of John Locke reflect the essence of
this understanding:
The end of a religious society . . . is the public worship
of God . . . . A church, then, I take to be a voluntary
society of men, joining themselves together of their own
1lEven where statutes define religion, e.g., Universal Military Training and
Service Act §6(j), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §456(j) (Supp. 1967), the ultimate burden of
defining religion for legal purposes has fallen on the courts. See, e.g., United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). This function of the state has not gone unquestioned.
The New Jersey Superior Court has taken the position that:
There is no right in a state or an instrumentality thereof to determine that
a cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship of religion as the means
of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the
First Amendment and included in the liberty which is within the protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Kolbeck v. Kramner, 84 N.J. Super. 509, 574, 202 A.2d 889, 892 (1964). However
attractive this position may first appear in theoretical terms, it becomes difficult to
maintain in practice; if it were accepted, any organization could call itself a religion
and limits would have to be placed on the freedom granted by the free exercise clause.
12 In this article, the terms theism and deism, unless otherwise qualified, shall
be understood in the ordinary dictionary sense. According to WmsTv's THnD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 2370 (P. Gove ed. 1966), theism is a "belief in the
existence of a god or gods; [specifically] . . . belief in the existence of one God who
is viewed as the creative source of man, the world, and value, and who transcends
and yet is imminent in the world . . . ." Deism is a "natural religion based on
human reason and morality, on the belief in one God who after creating the world
and the laws governing it refrained from interfering with the operation of those laws,
and on the rejection of every kind of supernatural intervention in human affairs
. ... " Id. at 595.
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accord in order to achieve the public worshipping of God in
such manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and effectual
to the salvation of their souls.3
An example of a judicial expression of this traditional understanding
was provided by the Nebraska Supreme Court, which said, in State
v. Scheve,'4 that it was the duty of the state to protect "every religious
. . . society whose members are accustomed to come together for the
purpose of worshipping the Supreme Being." "1
One of the most important judicial justifications for the traditional
understanding of religion is found in the opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Berman v. United States,"
where the court interpreted a provision in the Selective Service Act
of 194017 exempting from combatant military service any person who
by "religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to par-
ticipation in war in any form." is The court maintained that the
term "religious training and belief," was used to distinguish a mere
"conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion to a high moralistic
philosophy," from a religious belief based upon an individual's belief
in his "responsibility to an authority higher and beyond any worldly
one." :1'
In support of this interpretation, the court first looked to the
intention of the framers of the Constitution. The court argued:
It would be quite ridiculous to argue that the use of the word
"religion" would have been understood by the authors . . .
as meaning to be inclusive of morals or of devotion to human
welfare or of policy of government.2"
13J. LocyE, A LETmR CoNCERNING To RATIo 22, 20 (2d ed. P. Romanell ed.
1937).
14 65 Neb. 853, 93 N.W. 169 (1903).
'5 Id. at 879, 93 N.W. at 170. Another example of this judicial understanding
appears in Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9 (1868), where the court quoted approvingly
from :
Robins' Religions of all Nations [where at] page 6, it is said "the religious
world is divided into four grand systems, viz.: Christianity, Judaism, Moham-
medanism, and paganism. . . . Paganism-of all those who have not the
knowledge of the God, but worship idols. . . . The only people who may not
be classed under one of these four divisions are the deist and the atheists, the
latter differing from them all, in owning no religion, and the former in owning
no divine revelation as the foundation of their religion."
Id. at 54. See also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890); United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 633, 633-34 (1931) (Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, dissenting).
A 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
17 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889
(1940).
18 Id.
19 156 F2d at 380.
20 Id.
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There is some historical support for the court's position. For example,
in 1784 James Madison defined religion as "the duty which we owe
to our creator, and the manner of discharging it." 21 Madison also
referred to the "Governor of the Universe," "The universal sovereign,"
"God" and the "Supreme Law-Giver of the Universe." ' These
references seem to support the proposition that, for Madison at least,
some notion of divinity was an essential aspect of religion.
The court then asked whether, as a matter of social fact, the gen-
erally accepted definition of religion had changed, notwithstanding the
intention of the framers. The court found that some change had taken
place; however, it said:
[A] I1 the discoveries of science and the deepest reach of minds
do not fill a life or satisfy the soul hunger to understand the
daily joys and sadnesses and disappointments of life or to
understand the ultimate purpose of creation. . . . The area
of our logical equations comes to an end, but we do not assign
all beyond as a great vacancy. . . . The intellectually satisfy-
ing Meditations of Marcus Aurelius do not suffice for the boy
in the fox hole, under fire. His philosophy is not called upon
in that agonizing hour. He goes direct to his god to bolster
his flagging strength and courage. 3
This argument is not fully convincing. Admittedly in hours of
great need, when the logical equations do come to an end, most people
call upon God for emotional support and for an understanding of life
in its basic sense. But there may be people who turn to something
other than a God, to provide them with the same emotional support and
understanding of life. Indeed, it is difficult to understand that the
court rested its theistic approach on whether a "boy in the fox hole"
does or does not rely on God, as an empirical proposition. Rather,
the example is used to confirm the court's understanding that at some
point, "Faith 'which passeth all understanding' carries on." It is this
phenomenon which is religious in the court's view. If it is this
phenomenon which is religious-a psychologically defined phenomenon
of supra-rational reliance on a support-giving fundamental-the court's
theistic conclusion is not compelled; there is no reason why, for certain
persons, religious faith may not have as its ultimate object something
other than the traditional God.
But the court found more support for its position. Congress, it
said, presumably was aware of the traditional approach of the Supreme
21 Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance on the Religious Rights of Man, in
CORNERSTONES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDom IN AmmIucA, 84 (J. Blau ed. 1964).
221d. at 84-90.
23156 F2d at 380-81.
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Court to religion. Yet, in writing the Selective Service Act, Congress
did nothing to indicate dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's inter-
pretations of the term. Pronouncements by the Court accepting religion
as belief in a "Creator" and "God" were in accord with "man in the
street" opinion, and Congress could reasonably be expected to reflect
this common understanding.2 4
Berman represents a judicial expression of the main arguments in
defense of the traditional understanding of religion. Perhaps these
arguments were so thoroughly made in Berman because the traditional
understanding was under serious attack by 1946.25 Three years earlier,
another court of appeals had defined religion quite differently under
the same statute.
III
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit began to move
toward a broad definition of religion in 1943 in United States v.
Kauten,26 another conscientious objector case. Kauten indicated on his
Selective Service questionnaire that he was opposed to participating in
all war. But in answering the question whether this opposition was
by virtue of "religious training and belief," Kauten crossed out the
word "religious" and noted that, "this is not my case." 2' His request
for conscientious objector status was denied; this led to an induction
order and his prosecution for refusing to obey that order. The court
24 It is especially difficult to impute to Congress an intention to broaden the cur-
rent legal definition of religion in the context of an exemption to a draft law. A
broad exemption would frustrate the public policy underlying the draft law itself-the
prompt and efficient prosecution of war, which is a matter of utmost concern to the
state. Thus, in this circumstance, it would seem more reasonable to assume that
Congress intended to confine the category of exemptions within narrow limits. In
other circumstances, Congress might reasonably take a broader view. If the issue
were, for example, whether the leader of a non-theistic organization claiming to be
religious is entitled to celebrate marriages in the District of Columbia, Congress could
well consider that no public policy objective would be defeated if it answered that
question affirmatively.
Perhaps more critical evaluation should be made of the court's further argument
that most English language dictionary definitions of religion also require "a belief in
some superhuman power" or the "service and adoration of God." Berman v. United
States, 156 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1946). An objection to this may be that, unless
all dictionary definitions of religion have reference to a belief in a God, the dictionary
does not bolster the courts position. The court did not, and indeed could not, assert
such a finding. Yet, in favor of the court's argument is the limited purpose for which
it was made-to further demonstrate the common understanding of what religion is,
which the Congress, without defining religion otherwise, should be presumed to have
reflected.
25 It remained true, however, that with few exceptions, e.g., Ex parte Jentzsch,
112 Cal. 468, 44 P. 803 (1896); the predominant judicial understanding of religion
was along traditional lines. E.g., Opinion of the Justices, 309 Mass. 555, 34 N.E.2d
431 (1941) ("Supreme Being"); Nikulnikoff v. Archbishop, 142 Misc. 894, 901, 255
N.Y.S. 653, 663 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ("to render God the worship due to Him").
26133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
27 Id. at 707 n.2 .
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of appeals found no error in the denial of conscientious objector status
because Kauten was obviously a non-religious conscientious objector.
In the course of the opinion, Judge Augustus Hand gratuitously offered
a definition of religion:
Religious belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of
reason as a means of relating the individual to his fellow men
and to his universe-a sense common to men in the most
primitive and in the most highly civilized societies. It accepts
the aid of logic but refuses to be limited by it. It is a belief
finding expression in a conscience which categorically re-
quires the believer to disregard elementary self-interest and
to accept martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets.
[A] conscientious objection to participation in any
war under any circumstances . . . may justly be regarded as
a response of the individual to an inward mentor, call it
conscience or God, that is for many persons at the present
time the equivalent of what has always been thought a re-
ligious impulse.2"
This statement, which amounts to a broad, non-theistic definition
of religion, was understood to be of general applicability and was quoted
approvingly by Mr. Justice Frankfurter later in the same year.- More-
over, in two subsequent cases, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit released conscientious objectors from prison because, on the
basis of the dictum in Kauten, selective service officials had erred in
finding their non-theistic beliefs to be non-religious."a
Although Judge Hand's statement is not entirely clear,3 1 it is
possible to use it as a starting point from which to formulate a legal
standard which distinguishes religion from non-religion and eliminates
the necessity for a "belief in God":
religion is a belief in a final reality, based not entirely on
reason, relating the individual to his fellow man and the
universe, and finding expression in veneration and an inward
mentor called conscience.
3 2
28Id. at 708.
29 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 658-59 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
30 United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 152 F2d 627 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 817 (1946) ; United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir.
1943).
31 There are a number of aspects of this definition of religion as formulated by
Judge Hand which seem unclear, e.g., what kind of belief is it, and, what is meant
by "conscience or God" as an inward mentor?
32 Conscience is defined in WEusTER's THnD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICriONARY
(P. Gove ed. 1966) as
the sense of right or wrong within the individual . . . : The awareness of
the moral goodness or blameworthiness of one's own conduct, intentions, or
character together with a feeling of obligation to do or be that which is
recognized as good often felt to be instrumental in producing feelings of guilt
or remorse for ill-doing. .. ."
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Or, to state it differently, religion is a belief which:
(1) is based not entirely on reason or empirical evidence;
(2) refers to a final or ultimate reality;
(3) relates the believer to his fellow men and the universe;
(4) finds expression in an attitude of veneration or devotion
towards the final reality;
(5) finds expression in an inward mentor called conscience. 33
At the outset it should be emphasized that this is a definition of re-
ligion only in an operational sense, a description of the beliefs operative
within an individual, distinct from a definition in an institutional sense,
which refers to patterns of associated behavior. 4 Furthermore, of the
five characteristics of the belief, only the first can be identified as such
by the outside observer, that is, as based not entirely on reason or
empirical evidence; the other four characteristics are necessarily evident
only to the believer himself. Thus, only the believer knows the nature
and relationships of this final reality, and how his belief relates him to
his fellow man and the universe. Crucial to religion is the individual's
belief, 5 a belief in something which imposes obligations superior to the
obligations arising from human relationships. We think almost by re-
flex of some notion of God. But the revered final reality could even be
a fundamental rule by which man derives norms for conduct, as, for
example, in some understandings of Judaism or Unitarianism. The
typical religious individual believes that there is an omnipotent God
which must be obeyed. His beliefs about God or, His will need be
true only subjectively-not objectively. For the purposes of the
Selective Service Act, an individual who believes in a God to whom
he has duties superior to those arising from any human relation, one
of which is not to kill, is a conscientious objector regardless of whether
the draft board shares this belief; a draft board judges only the
sincerity of the individual in stating this belief.
Suppose, however, an individual believes there is a Being prior to
man, beyond temporal reality, known to those who believe and who
must be obeyed, but he refuses to label this being God. Is that indi-
vidual non-religious? This would seem to be a silly semantic distinc-
3 3 Certain words may be substituted for others in the definition without changing
its meaning. Thus "ultimate" may be substituted for "final" reality (the latter is
not intended to be understood in an exclusively temporal sense) ; similarly, "devotion"
or "reverence," as a description of a claimant's attitude, may be substituted for
"veneration."
34 See text accompanying note 37 infra, for a definition of a religious institution,
and a discussion of why a religion must be defined in both an operational and an
institutional sense.
35 This view is consistent with Locke's understanding: "... true religion con-
sist[s] in the inward and full persuasion of the mind .... " Locxs, supra note 13,
at 18.
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tion. The only reasonable conclusion is that a man who believes in the
existence of something which has the attributes of what other persons
call God, and which has the same meaning for him, is a religious man.
However, what of an individual who believes in something which
does not have the descriptive characteristics ordinarily attributed to a
supernatural Being or God, but which has the same ultimate meaning
for the individual as God does to the believers in Him? In Taoism, for
example, the Tao was before the earth or sky, silent, aloof, alone,
changing not, touching all, great and infinite. One must love and
follow Tao, yet Tao is indescribable and nameless.3" Is a believer in
Tao a religious man? According to our suggested definition he would
be, because the function served by the belief for the individual is de-
cisive. For the Taoist, Tao does relate the individual to his fellow man
and to the universe, and the belief results in characteristic attitudes. In
serving these functions for the believer, such a belief corresponds to
the Christian belief in God.
The function of belief is crucial in the operational definition of
religion. But what of those persons who say they believe in God, but
for whom this belief apparently serves no function either in influencing
their behavior or in deepening their understanding of the universe or
fellow man? Such people may nominally be members of a church,
noting on work applications that they are, for example, Methodists. At
the same time, objectively speaking, their behavior in no way seems
influenced by the teachings of Methodism; they do not even go to their
church frequently. These people do not think that the belief system
of their church is wrong; they just do not think about the beliefs to a
great extent. Yet their statement that they are Methodists is accepted
at face value and few would call them irreligious.
The fact that such people generally are considered to be religious
indicates the necessity for having an institutional definition of religion,
in addition to an operational definition. A religious institution, or a
religion in an institutional sense, consists of any association of prac-
tices, rituals or ceremonies intended to confirm, manifest, express or
promote a belief, which for some persons is operationally religious.
37
86 LA0 Tzu, TAo TE CHING (R.. Blakney transl. 1955). Tao is often translated
in English as "Way" but understanding its meaning on the basis of brief translation
or even definition is often difficult for men trained in Western thought. Consider
the dictionary definition:
Taoism: the unitary first principle from which all existence and all change
in the universe spring: the unconditional amenable source of all reality that
transcends being and nonbeing by standing above and beyond all distinctions
b: eternal order of the universe ...
WEBSTER's THIRD NEWv INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2338 (P. Gove ed. 1966).
37The belief promoted by the institution must have been operationally religious
at some point in time. The persons for whom the belief is operationally religious
need not be alive; there may be a sacred writing proving the operationally religious
nature of the belief.
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A religious person may also be one who is associated with a religious
institution, as well as one who himself is religious in an operational
sense. Our hypothetical Methodist, then, is religious in that he
belongs to an institution,' the Methodist church, which consists of
rituals and ceremonies intended to express, to confirm and to promote
the belief of Methodism, which, for some Methodists, is religious in an
operational sense. Likewise, a person who practices asceticism is also
religious, for this is a practice intended to express, confirm or promote
a belief which for some persons is operationally religious.
If this distinction between religion as an operation of the mind
and religion as an institution is kept in mind, few difficulties will arise
for legal purposes.39 The alternatives to the use of such definitions for
religion would seem to be to permit anyone to call any belief a religion,
an overly relativistic position, or to insist on the traditional theistic
definition, which is too rigid. Obviously to permit citizens to label any
set of beliefs as religious would make it impossible for a legislature to
use religion as a basis of classification, even if only to promote its free
exercise. It could not exempt, for example, persons whose religious
beliefs required them to observe another day as their Sabbath from the
operation of the Sunday closing laws. If any belief were a religious
belief, anyone could exempt himself from the operation of the Sunday
closing laws by giving any reason.
On the other hand, a theistic definition is too narrow. It results
in legal classifications having little relationship to actual developments
in the religious field. The law must deal with real people in real social
situations. Law which remains static becomes irrelevant and fails to
serve justice.4" If changes in social patterns and opinions are reason-
38 To the person so engaged, this may be a peripheral or inessential way of
characterizing this performance, but the outside observer can identify the person's
behavior as institutionally religious.
39 In the conscientious objector situation, for example, the individual involved
must be religious in the operational sense; he personally must believe that his inward
mentor, conscience, prevents him from participating in war. Naturally there can be,
in this vast area of human experience, some superficially complicated situations. An
individual may make his religious institution his religion in an operational sense.
His institution might become his final reality, relating him to his fellow man, and
the teachings of his institution or its ceremonies and rituals might constitute or provide
his inward mentor. He may not articulate this or any belief at all which neatly fits
the operational definition-but he does know and assert that he must follow the teach-
ings of his religious institution, in terms of belief and practice. As in other situations,
the only test will be whether this adherence is sincere. But see note 38 supra.
40 For whatever be the superstructure and coping-stone of justice, it can have
neither stable strength, nor utility nor beauty, unless it is built squarely upon
the ground of actual social relations in the time and place; of materials apt
for the heat and stress of the actual social climate; and of a design which has
regard to the accommodation which men actually need, and to their tastes
and capacities.
J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCrION OF LAW 784 (1950).
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able and susceptible of judicial formulation, the law has the obligation
to incorporate these changes in order to remain relevant to the problems
and people it addresses.
It is true that a number of non-theistic beliefs originating in eastern
cultures have been recognized as being religious for legal purposes. But
the relevance of a liberal definition of religion is best established by
observing some recent developments in the Christian tradition. The
theology of the late Dr. Paul Tillich, for example, does not involve a
belief in the traditional God. Yet it has been widely recognized and
accepted as a legitimate expression of Protestant Christianity. As the
late Jesuit scholar, Gustave Weigel, put it: "Any witness of the
Protestant reality looks for someone to give a unified meaning to the
whole thing. I believe I have found that man in Professor Paul
Tillich." 41
The non-theistic definition of religion proposed here is not based
on the content of belief. Under the definition Dr. Tillich was re-
ligious-not because of what he believed, but because of what his
beliefs meant to him. Those who insist on theism, however, must
exclude him (and, by implication, possibly his distinguished theological
admirers as well '). It is difficult to understand the practical justifica-
tion for such a result.
A non-theistic and non-deistic definition of religion is not only
reasonable and susceptible of judicial formulation, but also can be
reconciled with the purposes of the framers. On the whole it may be
conceded that these men had a theistic God in mind when they referred
to religion. But this does not mean that references to religion in the
Constitution must be confined to mean only theistic beliefs. The
framers conceived of a distinction between matters pertaining to the
state and matters pertaining to God. The framers also recognized
that men's allegiance to their God would be superior to the allegiance
owed to man himself, or to the state. Their purpose, however, was not
to establish "true" notions of religion in the Constitution; it was
rather to place limits on legitimate state power as against the indi-
vidual. The framers understood that man's allegiance to God was not
severed when civil society was formed to accomplish certain human
purposes. Thus, it is of the same constitutional significance that
today men give such allegiance to equivalent objects, not called God,
but having the same meaning for them. The first amendment was
4
1 Quoted in N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1965, at 31, col. 3.
42 E.g., Dr. Gerald Brauer, Dean, University of Chicago Divinity School, who
called Dr. Tillich "[theology's] . . . most eloquest spokesman". NiwswEs, Nov . 1,
1965, at 60. Many other contemporary religious ideas are relevant to a discussion of
liberalization of the theistic definition as well, such as Uni arianism-Universalisrn, to
say nothing of the "death of God" movement.
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designed to limit state intrusion into the area of "operations of the
mind." Thomas Jefferson recognized this when he said:
The error seems not sufficiently eradicated, that the operations
of the mind, as well as the acts of the body, are subject to the
coercion of the laws. . . The rights of conscience we never
submitted, we would not submit. We are answerable for
them to our God. The legitimate powers of government
extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it
does me no injury for my neighbors to say there are twenty
gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks
my leg.4
Government officials have no special competence to judge the
beliefs of other men which relate them to their fellow men and the
universe, and which help them distinguish right from wrong. This
is a fundamental, personal matter. The competence of government,
according to the Constitution, is with public affairs. Of course "morals
or . . . devotion to human welfare or . . . policy of government," 4
as the Berman court put it, were subjects assigned to the legislature.
But the definition proposed here clearly requires religion to involve
more than morals or welfare or government; the theists err in assuming
that only a belief directed toward God concerns more than these
subjects.
In concluding this section, perhaps it is helpful to apply the pro-
posed definition of religion to answer the questions posed at the
beginning of this discussion. Does religion necessarily involve a belief
in a Supreme Being? The answer is no, unless that term refers only
to any final reality of the type discussed in the definition above. 5 May
any individual belonging to no religious sect be religious? Yes-
only an individual can be religious in the operational sense, although
the burden, of course, should be on individuals seeking government
recognition of religious claims to articulate their belief. 6 It follows
then that religion does not necessarily involve an institutional structure.
To what extent should it be legally relevant that an individual or
group labels or refuses to label a particular belief as religious? It is
a Jefferson, Notes on Virginia: Query XVII, the Different Religions Received
into That State, in CORNERSTONES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Ix AMEImCA, 81 (J. Blau
ed. 1964) (emphasis added).
4Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
795 (1946).
45 See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra, 79 infra; United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
46f he proves, instead, his adherence to some sacred writing, by definition he
proves his adherence to a religious institution.
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most relevant. A refusal to label a belief as religious, while in a legal
context asserting a freedom or privilege granted on the basis of religion,
seems inconsistent although it is not unknown. 7 Under the standard
proposed here, a court should be required to make clear to the claimant
what it means by religion, because he might understand the term only
in a conventional institutional sense." However, if an individual
maintains that his belief, even including a belief in God, is not religious,
it is not for the government to say that it is.
Must religion involve beliefs at all? Yes, but not in the same
way for everybody. Some persons merely engage in rituals and
ceremonies. Others see these practices as confirmation or promotion
of beliefs which are religious. The persons who engage in ceremonies
and rituals acknowledge some kind of identification with people for
whom these beliefs are operationally religious. The point is that, at
least indirectly, religion involves belief.49
Must religion involve some sort of ritual? Must its adherents
meet? Must there be designated leaders who perform specified roles?
The answers to these questions turn on the distinction between religion
in its operational and institutional senses. Religion for the individual
does not necessarily involve ritual, although for many it will. But
meetings, rituals, ceremonies and specialized designated leaders are
all part of what has been called a religious institution. In the nature of
things, most individuals holding religious beliefs seek confirmation or
promotion of these beliefs through association with others, but an
institutional aspect is not essential. Thus, the answer to each of the
questions is no, when speaking of religion in an individual; yes, when
referring to an institution of religion.
These, then, are the standards proposed for legally determining
the existence of religion. Other legal tests not involving a belief in
God also have been proposed and must be compared with the tests
suggested here.
IV
In Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,5 the California
First District Court of Appeals stated that theism is not an essential
4 7 Jehovah's Witnesses have denounced all religion as a "snare and a racket."
Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 167 (1943) (separate opinion of Jackson, J.).
48E.g., in United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (1943), under the standard
proposed here, the Selective Service System would have been required to explain to
Kauten that it meant religion in the operational sense.49 In Morey v. Riddell, 205 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Cal. 1962), a church with no
distinctive identifying name, written constitution, by-laws or operational guide other
than the Holy Bible was conceded to be "religious" for the purpose of granting indi-
viduals tax deductions for contributions to the church under INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 170. This is consistent with the definition here: the belief is in God whose Biblical
word is so revered that it must not be obscured by the "arbitrary gloss" of a de-
nominational name and a written organizational guide.
6153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P2d 394 (1957).
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element of religion and engaged in a full discussion of its reasons for
taking this position. The issue was whether the Fellowship of
Humanity should be exempt from taxation on its property by reason
of California's constitutional provision exempting property and build-
ings "used solely and exclusively for religious worship." " The court
argued that tax exemptions for religious property are justified only
because the churches perform activities which promote the public
welfare. Since the Fellowship of Humanity's activities "in all respects
. . . are similar to those of the theistic groups, except for their belief
or lack of belief in a Supreme Being . . . . It therefore follows, that
the constitutional exemption is equally applicable to both groups." 52
The Court further argued that a proper interpretation of "re-
ligion" in tax exemption laws "should not include any reference to
whether the beliefs involved are theistic or nontheistic." - The Court
suggested different criteria for defining religion, observing that some
authorities recognize non-theistic beliefs as religious and noting that
any judicial determination of the validity or content of a belief is
foreclosed by United States v. Ballard."
Thus the only inquiry in such a case is the objective one
of whether or not the belief occupies the same place in the
lives of its holders that the orthodox beliefs occupy in the
lives of believing majorities, and whether a given group that
claims the exemption conducts itself the way groups conceded
to be religious conduct themselves. The content of the belief,
under such test, is not a matter of governmental concern.
Under this test the belief or non-belief in a Supreme
Being is a false factor. The only way the state can determine
the existence or nonexistence of "religious worship" is to
approach the problem objectively ...
Religion simply includes: (1) a belief, not necessarily
referring to supernatural powers; (2) a cult, involving a
gregarious association openly expressing the belief; (3) a
system of moral practice directly resulting from an adherence
to the belief; and (4) an organization within the cult de-
signed to observe the tenets of belief.55
61 CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1Y.
52 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, '698,
315 P.2d 394, 410 (1957).
53 Id. at 693, 315 P.2d at 406.
54322 U.S. 78 (1944) (only issue in mail fraud case involving defendant's religious
belief was his good faith, and not the truth or falsity of his beliefs).
65 153 Cal. App. 2d at 692-93, 315 .P.2d at 406.
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The first portion of this definition, the "parallel position" standard,
is compatible with the test proposed.above. 56 However, the court also
required a cult, involving a gregarious association openly expressing
a belief. But a cult is only an aspect of religion in an institutional
sense; a solitary individual also can have a religion. Likewise, the
court requires an organization within the cult designed to observe the
tenets of belief; yet religion may exist without any organization. The
court states that a system of moral practice results from adherence to
a religious belief, but must a person who says he is religious actually
have such a system? One way to answer this question, as well as
to solve the other problems under the court's definition, would be to
introduce operational-institutional categories. The court did not seem
to have anticipated that once a non-theistic definition of religion was
formulated, difficulties of this nature would arise.
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia "
suggests the possibility of another test by which courts can determine
whether a non-theistic group is eligible for the tax exemption granted
to religious organizations. The issue in that case was whether the
society's building should be tax exempt, as one "primarily and regu-
larly used by its congregation for public religious worship." - The
court held that the society's building was exempt under the statute. It
observed that the activities taking place in the building were very
similar to activities taking place in many "formal or traditional church
organizations." 19 The Society had regular Sunday services which
were spiritually guided by a Leader and at which members sang,
meditated and read from the Bible. Furthermore, the court felt that
religion was not a rigid concept, and "to construe exemption so strictly
that unorthodox or minority forms of worship would be denied the
exemption benefits granted to those conforming to the majority beliefs
might well raise constitutional issues." I The court explicitly dis-
claimed decision as to whether the Ethical Society is "in an eccle-
siastical sense a religious society or a church .... ," 01 However.
its approach suggests a possible legal standard of accepting a group
as religious when the practices in which the members of the group
engage are similar or equivalent to those of recognized religions. It
56 The Supreme Court used this part of the California court's definition (without
acknowledgment) in United. States v. See ger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
67249 F.2d- 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
58 D.C. CoDE ANN.: § 47-801(a) (m) (1966).
59 249 F.2d at 128.
0 Id. at 129.
a Id.
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may be noted that the activities which the court mentions have been
regarded here as the definition of a religious institution if they are
expressions of beliefs that some individuals regard as religious. But
"equivalence of practice" fails as a standard; on the face of it, at least,
a tribal dance or the handling of snakes have as much claim to religion
as the reading from the Bible or the taking of bread and wine. Such
a standard would tend to prejudice recognition of novel or strange in-
stitutions of religion. What must be decisive in a test is whether the
practices confirm, promote or express a belief which is religious to
some people.
The most important recent judicial statement defining religion
appears in the 1965 decision of United States v. Seeger.0 The opinion
concerned three conscientious objectors, each of whom believed in
something other than the traditional Supreme Being as the basis of
their alleged religion. The issue was whether such beliefs were re-
ligious within the conscientious objector provision of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act of 1948:
Religious training and belief in this connection means an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but
does not include essentially political, sociological, or philo-
sophical views or a merely personal moral code.'
Alternatively, the question was whether this definition constitutes an
impermissible classification under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, because it fails to embrace all faiths which can validly
claim to be called religious.
One of the cases before the court came from the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit," which had held that the statutory language
followed the distinction that court had made in Berman "5 and, thus,
that the defendant's belief could not be regarded as religious for
legal purposes.
The second case came from the second circuit, which in United
States v. Jakobson,"6 took an entirely different view of the matter.
It noted that in Torcaso v. Watkins67 the Supreme Court held that
the first amendment forbade "aid [to] those religions based on a
62380 U.S. 163 (1965).
63S0 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).
64 Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963).
65 Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795
(1946). See text accompanying notes 6-8. The court observed that the Senate Armed
Services Committee Report cited Berman in commenting on the insertion of the new
language. See note 75 infra.
66325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963).
67 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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belief in an existence of God as against those religions founded on
different beliefs;" Is since this conscientious objector provision aids
religion, the exemption in order "to avoid 'grave and doubtful con-
stitutional questions . . .'" must be construed "as broadly as the
words permit." 69 Thus construed, the court held that the statute does
not require an "anthropomorphic deity" o or a "God up there." "'
Without supplying its own definition of religion, it said the term
surely must encompass views like Paul Tillich's-views which were
similar to the defendant's. The court did not deal with the problem
of what happens if a belief is so unorthodox or so newly founded as to
be unlike those of any known theologian, a difficulty which arises
whenever a standard involves comparison of the content of one belief
to another.
The third case before the Supreme Court in Seeger also came from
the second circuit, and also resulted in the recognition of a non-theistic
belief as religious. But the second circuit's conclusion in Seeger 2 was
based on its holding that the "Supreme Being" requirement in the
statute was an impermissible classification which violated the due
process clause of the fifth amendment:
. legislative power to deny a particular privilege alto-
gether does not imply an equivalent power to grant such a
privilege on unconstitutional conditions. . . . [A] require-
ment of belief in a Supreme Being, no matter how broadly
defined, cannot embrace all those faiths which can validly
claim to be called "religious." '
The Court did not propose an alternative to the congressional standard
for distinguishing between religion and non-religion.
Thus the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Seeger was
written on a record of three very different, if incomplete, treatments
of the same statutory language. Its own holding followed the broad
lines of the Jakobson opinion, stating that belief in something other
than the traditional Supreme Being can qualify as a religion in terms of
the Congressional definition. The Supreme Being clause, the Court
held, was "no more than a clarification of the 1940 provision involving
6id. at 495.
69 United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409, 415 (2d Cir. 1963).
70 ld.
71Id.
72United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
73 Id. at 851, 852.
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only certain 'technical amendments,' to use the words of Senator
Gurney," 7 who was "Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee and sponsor of the Senate bill containing the present version of
§ 6(j)." 7' Thus, under this Act, as before, "it was necessary only
to have a conviction based upon religious training and belief." " The
language was inserted simply to "clari[fy] the meaning of religious
training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essen-
tially political, sociological, or philosophical views." 7 In explaining
the standard, the Court said:
• . . the test of belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being" is
whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies
a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the
exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the
lives of their respective holders we cannot say that one is "in
a relation to a Supreme Being" and the other is not. 8
The Court's approach thus surmounts the difficulties in the lower court
opinions. In contrast to the ninth circuit's approach, its formulation
takes account of all religious beliefs, including those not involving
traditional concepts of God. Furthermore, in accepting the Con-
gressional standard as a valid way of defining religion, the Court
interprets the definition so as to avoid a comparison of the content of
one belief with that of another. It is the psychological significance of
the belief to the believer which is crucial, rather than the substantive
content of the belief. The key question is: what place does the belief
occupy in the life of its possessor?
But it may be argued that this question, and the Court's standard
generally, is too vague. Under it, for example, if a person believes in
something with great zeal, his belief may be said to be religious on the
ground that orthodox religious beliefs have been held with great zeal.
However, the Court guards against this erroneous interpretation of
its standard by stating:
74 380 U.S. at 179.
751d. The Senate Armed Services Committee Report had cited the Berman
decision directly in commenting on the insertion of the new language. The Supreme
Court was thus pressed to explain that citation. It said the same Report "specifically
states that § 6(j) was intended to re-enact 'substantially the same provisions as were
found' in the 1940 Act"; furthermore, there was no indication of any Congressional
concern over any conflict between Kauten and Berman. Id. at 176, 178.
76 Id. at 176.
77 Id. at 165.
78Id. at 165-66.
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Within [the phrase, "religious training and belief"] would
come all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a
power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is sub-
ordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent."9
In other words, belief must be in a final reality of some kind-a power
or being or faith-to which all else is subordinate or upon which all
else is ultimately dependent. A zealously held belief in something does
not necessarily occupy a place parallel to the belief in God; rather, the
key is the relationship between the power or being or faith, on the one
hand, and the universe, on the other. This relationship will have an
explanatory function for the believer; it will put things in perspective
much in the same way as a belief in God does. It will serve to relate
the individual believer to his fellow man and the universe Moreover,
there is a limit to religion: it is a belief which has an explanatory force
to the believers and thereby involves a reality to which everything else
is subordinate or ultimately dependent.
The Supreme Court's standard thus at least partially achieves the
same objective as the standard proposed here: it broadens the definition
of religion and at the same time keeps the term meaningful. That
broadened legal definition is consistent with contemporary religious
developments as they are understood by the believers themselves80
At the same time, the Court avoids some of the pitfalls in previous
attempts to formulate a non-theistic definition. As in the formulation
proposed here, the Court did not attempt to compare the content of
one belief to another. It did not compare the practices of one religious
claimant to those of another. In these ways, the Court's standard helps
to prevent discrimination against beliefs that seem incredible, or prac-
tices which seem strange viewed from the perspective of familiar re-
ligious practices.
On the other hand, it is true that in the Seeger case, the Supreme
Court did not deal with institutional questions in its definition. It is
also true that in this area much of the confusion in judicial opinions
has existed in the past; courts have seemed to reject the religious
status of a practice in deciding a free exercise claim.8' Not only does
a theoretical view of religion demand a consistent treatment of these
problems, but the allegation that an institution is religious invariably
is an important issue in decisions under the establishment clause. A
79 Id. at 176.
80 See, e.g., note 47 supra and accompanying text.
81 State v. King Colony Ranch, 137 Mont. 145, 350 P.2d 841 (1960) ; People v.
Ashley, 184 App. Div. 520, 172 N.Y.S. 282 (1918). But cf. Sheldon v. Fannin, 221
F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963).
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non-theistic definition does not preclude a solution to these problems,8 2
but they were not before the Court in Seeger.83
In sum, while courts in recent years have moved toward a non-
theistic definition of religion, none has had occasion, either in a single
decision, or in a series of decisions, to supply a definition which is
theoretically sound and which is at the same time comprehensive.
Nevertheless, such a definition is important, since legal privileges and
exemptions accrue to the status of religion. These benefits should not
be applied in a discriminatory manner because the definition of religion
is inadequate. It is simultaneously necessary that "religion" be limited
in such a way that the classification does not become meaningless. The
non-theistic definition proposed here, analyzing religion in both its
operational and institutional aspects, should succeed in establishing a
universal standard with sufficient limits to be legally meaningful.
82 In terms of the establishment clause, religion refers to the majority's concept
of the term, while under the free exercise clause, it refers to the minority's concept.
See Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963). This thought has been
developed in terms of the definitional scheme proposed here in S. Boyan, The Expand-
ing View of the Free Exercise of Religion Clause, Sept. 1966 (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation in University of Chicago Library).
83 In fact, even the meaning of "religion" under the free exercise clause was not
before the Court; only the interpretation of particular statutory language was. It
may be doubted, in light of the Court's view in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961), that the standard under the more general language of the first amendment
would be less liberal. It may also be noted that recently Congress has eliminated
the "Supreme Being" clause in the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A.
App. §456(j) (Supp. 1967). According to the Report of the House Armed Services
Committee, "the Director of Selective Service advised the Committee . . . that in
his judgment this undue expansion [in United States v. Seeger] of the provision of
the law relating to conscientious objection could very easily result in a substantial
increase in the number of unjustified appeals for exemption from military service
based upon this provision of the law." H.R. Rr2. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 31
(1967). It is difficult to say, however, how this change will secure the desired effect.
The section now reads like the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 provisions
on the subject, see note 17 supra, under which a number of liberal interpretations
were given. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. See also note 32 upra.
Furthermore, the "Supreme Being" clause seemed to be a restriction on what beliefs
a court could recognize as religious; but for the Committee report, removal of the
provision would seem to broaden judicial discretion.
